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and William Coon*
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
By now, the number of uninsured Americans - approximately
45 million - has been splashed across our headlines with enough
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the Long Term Care Coordinating Council, the Small Business Advocacy
Council, and the Emergency Management Advisory Council. Roberts
graduated from Brown University in 1978 and earned an MBA in health care
management from Boston University. Before serving in the Senate, Roberts
worked as a business strategy consultant, policy analyst, and health care
manager. William Coon is currently a Policy Intern with the Office of the
Lieutenant Governor. He received his Bachelor of Science from McGill
University in 2007. Lindsay McAllister served as a legal intern with the
Office of the Lieutenant Governor in 2009. She received her Bachelor of Arts
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frequency that nearly everyone has it committed to memory.
Actually, well over 45 million are uninsured today - and millions
more are underinsured. Here in Rhode Island, nearly 28 percent
of residents younger than sixty-five years of age were uninsured
at some point between 2007 and 2008. What is particularly
startling, however, is that just over three-quarters of the
uninsured in Rhode Island are from working families, be they full
or part-time.1 Though it can be easy to let these numbers become
abstract or intangible statistics, particularly when we see or hear
them so often, what they reveal is undeniable: the health care
system is functionally and fiscally broken. It has become a factor
that holds our nation back in terms of global competitiveness and
it has significant human costs for our citizens. In fact, in 2007,
just over 62 percent of all bankruptcies across the country were
medical in nature.2 Again, it is telling that most filers were
insured, well educated, and owned homes - three-quarters of
those who filed for medical bankruptcy had middle-class
occupations; therefore, this is a trend that is also affecting those
that had health insurance.3
Without a doubt, the Obama Administration is responding to
these symptoms of system breakdown and has made national
health reform a top priority despite the substantial political risks
that historically accompany such initiatives. With an eye for
expediency, the Administration charged Congress with the task of
crafting reform legislation on a tight timeline, but to date, such
speedy progress has proven hard to come by. What is clear,
however, is that in spite of pushback, delays and pitfalls, health
reform is a necessary stepping stone for the United States on its
return from recession. Nationally, health care costs have
increased by 6 to 7 percent each year for the last decade and have
consistently grown faster than the economy itself since the 1960s.4
1. Families USA, New Report Finds 254,000 Rhode Islanders Were
Uninsured at Some Point in 2007-2008, April 7, 2009,
http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/newsroom/press-releases/new-report-
finds-254000.html.
2. David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United
States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 742-743
(2009).
3. Id. at 742-44.
4. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is Health Care Reform Worth $1.6 Trillion?, N.Y.
TIMES EcoNoMIx BLOG (June 26, 2009),
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In fact, given that the gross domestic product (G.D.P.) is expected
to decline this year, health care costs are expected to account for
18 percent of the G.D.P.5 If nothing else, this is definitive
evidence of the fact that health care spending has become a real
impediment to our status as a global competitor.
II. A DISJOINTED SYSTEM IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESCALATING
COSTS OF HEALTH CARE
To allow the status quo to continue would fly in the face of the
quest for national economic recovery. Accordingly, given the
current economic challenges that policy makers face, any reform
initiatives must also be cost-saving and fiscally responsible in both
the short and long term. As various proposals for reform are
considered, there are certain principles to keep in mind, including
the reality that whether or not a person has health insurance
inevitably affects where, when and what kind of health care they
will receive. Further, it also affects the cost of that care for that
individual - a cost that reverberates at the community, state and
national levels on the aggregate.
Due to the fact that those without health insurance are less
likely to access preventive and screening services and are less
likely to receive outpatient care on a regular basis, the probability
that these uninsured individuals will be hospitalized for
conditions that could have been avoided is significantly
increased. 6 In fact, if uninsured, a person is up to three times
more likely to report obstacles getting needed medical care - even
for serious conditions - than those with insurance.7 Furthermore,
about 20 percent of the uninsured report that the emergency room
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/is-health-care-reform-worth-
16-trillion; see also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE
COSTS AND SPENDING (Mar. 2009), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7692.cfm
(Click on "Fact Sheet" to download .pdf file).
5. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reader Response: How Much do we Spend on
Health Care?, N.Y. TIMES EcoNomix BLOG, (June 5, 2009),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/reader-response-how-much-do-
we-spend-on-health-care.
6. KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE
UNINSURED: A PRIMER 7 (Oct 2008), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/7451.cfm
(Click on "Issue Brief" to download .pdf file).
7. Id.
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is their primary source of care. 8  In 2004, these types of
preventable hospitalizations accounted for $29 billion in hospital
costs.9 When this care goes uncompensated, hospitals account for
their expenses by charging other payers - insurance companies,
employer plans, and individuals - higher prices. In 2005,
researchers estimated the amount of uncompensated care added
up to $43 billion nationally, two-thirds of which is paid for by
higher premiums for those with private health insurance.10 The
remaining one-third is borne by Medicare and other governmental
programs.11
The costs of providing needed health care to the uninsured
place a burden on the overall cost structure of the health care
system, but it is often the rising cost of premiums that prices
individuals out of the market and drives employers' decision to
drop employee coverage.12 For health reform to truly make an
impact on the number of uninsured Americans and improve the
quality of care, near - if not total - universal coverage must be the
goal. Without it, the cost shifting dynamic will continue to inflate
the cost of coverage for those who are insured, and insurance will
remain out of reach for many. However, experience has also
shown that universal coverage alone is not enough to make
quality care sufficiently affordable, and therefore a truly viable
health care system will need to address both coverage and cost
containment concerns simultaneously.
III. THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
A. An Individual Mandate for the Purchase of Coverage Will
Eliminate Two Drivers of Cost
In keeping with the goal of covering as many Americans as
possible, an individual mandate for the purchase of health
insurance will be an essential component of any national health
8. Id.
9. JANUARY ANGELES, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
INSURING ALL AMERICANS IS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF AN EFFICIENT, HIGH
QUALITY HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-21-
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care reform proposal. As noted in the New England Journal of
Medicine, some of the most glaring deficiencies in the U.S. health
insurance market can be attributed to the fact that it is
voluntary. 13  Failing to require that every individual obtain
coverage has inevitably led to a system less focused on prevention,
health maintenance and coordination, and more focused on later
and more costly treatment. There are two reasons for this
problem which are largely intertwined. First, without being
compelled to do so, the young and healthy typically will not seek
out health insurance until they actually need it. Second, because
the beneficiary pool thus tends to consist of those requiring
immediate and often, more urgent care, insurers' costs go up.
Consequently, insurance companies seek to avoid this trend by
underwriting - employing policies that delay or even deny
coverage based on factors such as age, lifestyle choices or pre-
existing conditions - which creates a major obstacle for many who
seek health insurance. 14 Massachusetts has led the nation in
mandating coverage for everyone. Over the long term, this
requirement will drive down the cost of premiums by "getting
everyone in the pool" - but only if this mandate for participation is
coupled with concurrent strategies to contain the underlying costs
of care. 15
An individual mandate for the purchase of health insurance
also addresses the number of young adults who lack health
insurance. Young adults aged nineteen to twenty-nine were the
least likely of any age group to have health insurance in 2007,
with over 30 percent lacking coverage. 16 Though cost is often
cited as a barrier for this population, young adults are also apt to
bet on their continued health and relative youth instead of
purchasing insurance. In fact, of the 5 million adults aged
nineteen to twenty-three in the United States without insurance
13. Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate - An
Affordable and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 6 (2009).
14. INSURING ALL AMERICANS, supra note 9, at 3.
15. Id.
16. NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, HEALTH CARE FACTS: YOUNG
ADULTS, available at
http:/Inchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/NCHC%2OFact%2OSheet%20-
%20Young%20Adults.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
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in 2006, 30 percent reportedly said they did not believe it was
worth the cost.17 Consequently, more than two-thirds of this
population did not see a doctor in the year they went without
insurance. 18 Without reaching this sizeable portion of the market,
reform will fail to attain the critical mass necessary to truly
succeed.
B. Building on What is in Place: An Employer Mandate Keeps
Employers in the Equation
Another key element to increasing coverage across the
country is the employer mandate, which not only presents an
opportunity to reduce the ranks of the uninsured, but also
allocates the cost of doing so more equitably. A mandate in the
form of a "pay or play" model would impose a fee on employers not
currently offering insurance to their employees, while waiving
that fee for those employers that do offer coverage. Historically,
the primary source of health insurance for nonelderly people in
the United States, employer-sponsored insurance, is a logical
framework from which to expand health coverage. 19 Furthermore,
80 percent of the uninsured in the United States have a
connection to the workforce, making employer sponsored
insurance a practical and attractive way of reaching out to this
population.20  Perhaps most importantly, a "pay or play"
requirement would also help to ensure that employers will not
stop offering coverage once subsidies, another vital piece of the
reform puzzle, are offered to low and moderate income families to
make buy-in at the individual level affordable. 21 Not only will
charging a fee to employers that do not offer employee plans act as
a deterrent to those that might have otherwise dropped their
17. Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, For
Many Young Adults, No Health Insurance, No Regular Doctor (June 24,
2009), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/nn/nn062409.htm.
18. Id.
19. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT
IS AN EMPLOYER "PAY-OR-PLAY" REQUIREMENT?, 1 (May 2009),
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7907.pdf [hereinafter EXPLAINING
HEALTH CARE REFORM].
20. Id. (citing KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, The
Uninsured: A Primer 1, 16 (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-05.pdf).
21. Id.
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insurance offerings, it may also persuade employers that have
historically not offered employee insurance plans to begin doing
SO.22
The employer mandate is not, however, without potential
pitfalls. In particular, with regard to the assessment of a fee or
penalty for employers who fail to provide health insurance, there
is a fine line to be walked. On the one hand, penalties must be
large enough to discourage employers from dropping their existing
coverage. Additionally, since the fees collected under "pay or play"
schemes serve as a revenue flow to pay for the subsidy to make
the individual purchase of insurance by the uninsured affordable,
the larger the fee, the more resources will be available to use
toward reducing the overall costs of covering the uninsured. On
the other hand, reform attempts at the state level thus far have
proven that too large a fee may provoke legal challenges rooted in
the jurisdiction of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).23 Health reform at the federal level
is likely to be necessary to finally address this problem of lining
up the principles of federalism with state level attempts to create
a scenario in which all employers have "skin in the game." The
insecure status of several state-based "pay or play" laws will
necessarily require a national solution. Indeed, given the
principles of federal preemption, any federal solution that includes
"pay or play" will likely resolve the ERISA dilemma in a way that
no state, acting unilaterally, can definitively accomplish.
C. An Adequate Affordability Subsidy is Essential to the
Feasibility of Any Individual Mandate
A federal subsidy will be critical to the success of an
individual mandate, given the number of those without a
connection to the workplace, or for whom employer-based coverage
is not an option because it simply is not offered or is unaffordable.
As health costs have risen steadily, employers have had to
respond. Some have increased their employee cost-sharing while
others have dropped their employee coverage altogether. In
22. Id.
23. OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY, COST AND COVERAGE: THE IMPACT OF
IMPLEMENTING VARIOUs STATE HEALTH CARE REFORM PROPOSALS NATIONALLY
15 (Summer 2008).
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Rhode Island, a majority of employers continue to offer employee
plans.2 4 Those ranks have, however, decreased in Rhode Island
from 79 percent in 1999, to 74 percent in 2005.25 Notably, for the
state's small employers (those that employ three to nine
employees), that number dips down to 65 percent. 26
The need for an affordability subsidy rings particularly true
in Rhode Island, where health insurance premiums are among the
highest in the country, a distinction which is also a likely
contributor to the decreasing rate of enrollees in employer plans. 27
Among those in Rhode Island who were offered coverage, 69
percent were enrolled in full-time employer-sponsored plans in
2005, compared with 80 percent in 1999.28 Consequently, if
health insurance enrollment is going to be mandatory, it needs to
be affordable in both the individual market and employer-
sponsored market. A 2005 Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health
Insurance Survey found that almost 90 percent of adults aged 19
to 64 who sought coverage in the individual market could not
purchase insurance because of prohibitive costs or ineligibility.29
Those who could afford it paid disproportionately high premiums
and copays; over 40 percent spent at least one-tenth of their
income on out-of-pocket expenses, compared with only 24 percent
of those with employer-sponsored plans.30
Employer-sponsored insurance can almost as easily remain
out of reach for many families. For example, a family of three
with an income at 300 percent of the federal poverty level spends
approximately 23 percent of its income on the average employer-
24. Id. at 4.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 17, 27; see also DEB FAULKNER ET AL., CONSIDERING A HEALTH
INSURANCE EXCHANGE: LESSONS FROM THE RHODE ISLAND EXPERIENCE 5,
http://www.statecoverage.org/files/Considering%20a%2OHealth%20Insurance
%20Exchange.pdf.
28. OFFICE OF THE HEALTH INS. COMM'R, 2005 RHODE ISLAND EMPLOYER
SURVEY RESULT 4 (October 2006),
http://www.dbr.state.ri.us/documents/divisions/healthinsurance/061024_FIN
AL_EmployersurveyREPORT.pdf.
29. SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY
RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND
FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 3 (2006),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/Collins-squeezedrisinghltcarecos
ts_953.pdf.
30. Id. at 12.
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based policy. 31 Although the share of total premiums costs that
workers are held responsible for has remained relatively stable
over the years, the steep growth in overall premium levels has
meant that over the past decade, workers are paying significantly
higher amounts than they did a few years ago. 32
The level at which the government should subsidize health
insurance for individuals is a question that is far from settled.
Although there is no universally recognized standard of
affordability for health premiums, a report by the Urban Institute
and the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts Foundation used
actual spending on health insurance premiums as a benchmark
for affordability.33 Actual spending was chosen as an indicator of
what people are "willing and able to spend" on health care. 34 The
analysis showed that those between 300 and 500 percent of the
poverty line spend about 8 percent of their incomes on premiums
in the non-group health-insurance market, and concluded that
affordability standards would have to be lower than 8 percent of
income for those making below 300 percent of the poverty line.35
For those at the lowest income levels, the premium standard
would necessarily reflect a larger share of income spent on
housing, food and other basic needs. 36 Additionally, setting a hard
and fast income level after which individuals or families would be
solely responsible for either their premiums or a fee for
noncompliance is not the most feasible option. Linking
affordability standards to a percentage of income rather than
expecting those at a certain level above the federal poverty line to
"go it alone," regardless of actual cost, seems more likely to lead to
the accomplishment of the "nearly" universal coverage goal.
Without a well thought out affordability standard linked to any
subsidy program, families sitting just above the poverty line would
31. JUDITH SOLOMON, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SENATE
FINANCE COMMITTEE FACES DIFFICULT CHOICE IN LOWERING COST OF
HEALTH BILL 8 (Jul. 1, 2009),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=2854.
32. EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM, supra note 19.
33. Linda J. Blumberg et al., Setting a Standard of Affordability for
Health Insurance Coverage, HEALTH AFFAIRS w465, June 4, 2007 (web
exclusive).
34. Id.
35. Id. at w468, w471.
36. Id. at w471.
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still struggle considerably to obtain coverage, or if they were
unable to, they would face a penalty and remain uninsured. 37
These factors will be important to consider when designing the
subsidy assistance policies necessary for effective comprehensive
reform.
D. The Great Potential of Health Insurance Purchase Exchanges
Comprehensive federal health reform legislation that
incorporates a subsidy to help the uninsured purchase insurance
will also likely include new mechanisms for the purchase of
insurance by those now without insurance - so called health
insurance exchanges. At its simplest, an exchange can serve as a
marketplace where people without health insurance can purchase
their insurance. Using the latest online information resources,
consumers can peruse information regarding available plans -
most likely differentiated in tiers by cost and coverage - and
choose the one that best fits their needs. The role for an exchange
can extend beyond just an online marketplace, however. Because
of the need to administer an affordable subsidy program,
exchanges may be able to take on a more substantial and
transformative role in health reform. Beyond serving as a
marketplace where the uninsured, self-employed and those
without a connection to employer-sponsored insurance can
purchase health insurance, an exchange could become a vehicle
for enacting larger market-based reforms. The frequently-cited
goals of creating a more organized and transparent health
insurance market - increasing competition among plans, and
making price and benefits standards easily comparable for
consumers - could potentially be executed via an exchange
entity.38
The question of just how much authority should be given to an
exchange remains a matter of contention across the various
federal legislative proposals, as is the question of whether
exchanges should operate at the state or national level. The result
of this debate will undoubtedly affect the breadth and scope of
37. Id. at w464 (explaining the dangers of Massachusetts' system).
38. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EXPLAINING HEALTH
CARE REFORM: WHAT ARE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES? 1-2 (2009),
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf.
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health reform. But if the goal is indeed to cover as many people as
possible, it is likely that exchanges will be necessary to accomplish
this goal. In fact, analysts are observing that the purchase
exchange in Massachusetts, referred to as the Health Insurance
Connector, together with the individual mandate, has increased
enrollment, which currently stands at 97 percent of residents.39
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and a group of
stakeholders recently conducted a study in Rhode Island to
identify and evaluate the best options for a state-based exchange
and to define the goals of such an entity. What the study
ultimately revealed can be replicated in many other states and
likely, at the national level. First, the study defined three
primary goals for an exchange: (1) to better organize the health
insurance market, (2) to provide access to affordable health
insurance for all Rhode Islanders, and (3) to drive system
affordability and cost containment. 40 Next, it fleshed out four key
factors in accomplishing those goals: (1) organizing the market
(simplify purchasing, improve choice and portability), (2)
establishing benefit standards and incentives (an individual
mandate), (3) serving as a location for subsidies, and (4)
containing costs by vigorously regulating the payment structures
and benefits in plans offered through the exchange. 41
Finally, the study laid out the core characteristics and
functions of an exchange that would be necessary to achieving its
goals. 42  First, including a public board with some analytic
capacity within the exchange was recognized as a way to
implement a subsidy program and enable a new purchasing
model.43 There was also a consensus that, in order to improve
benefit standards and incentives to obtain coverage, an individual
mandate and employer requirement were key elements for the
success of an exchange. 44 Finally, while a more targeted approach
39. Lea Winerman, PBS Newshour, In Legislation, New National Health
Insurance Exchange Emerges,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/healthljuly-decO9/exchange_07-23.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
40. FAULKNER ET AL., supra note 27, at 2.
41. Id. at 3.
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to simplifying the small group market would be appropriate in
Rhode Island, in order to contain costs and improve access, a more
broadly applied strategy was deemed necessary.45 Four exchange
approaches were framed as possible ways to enact successful
reform. 46 Specifically, these options included: (1) setting a
minimum benefit standard, (2) establishing an "affordability"
benchmark, (3) creating a new source of market information
aimed at organizing all product options on a single website, and
(4) establishing an administrative structure capable of handling
enrollment, billing and customer services that would enable
portability.47
IV. COMPREHENSIVE RATHER THAN PIECEMEAL REFORM IS
NECESSARY
Working together, insurance exchanges, coverage mandates,
and cost containment initiatives can make quality health care
affordable for all while minimizing the amount of subsidy
assistance needed to achieve universal coverage. Clearly, the
financial success of the exchange model depends on sufficient
enrollment.48 Increasing enrollment and keeping the risk pool
tenable can best be accomplished through an individual and
employer mandate, which can be enforced through the exchange.
For many, however, enrollment will remain impossible without an
adequate subsidy. What is now clear is that these elements,
considered independently, are incapable of achieving successful
and affordable health care reform. Governmental reform can,
however, only be accomplished within a historical context, not
independent of the economic and political conditions of the
moment. A health care system designed anew might have looked
different, but in light of the constraints imposed by our the
current national economic conditions and the many crippling
budget crises across the country, comprehensive reform must be
done in a way that attends carefully to the imperative to drive




47. Id. at 5, 6.
48. Id. at 5.
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V. REFORM EXPERIENCES IN OTHER STATES PROVIDE IMPORTANT
INSIGHTS
In the past decade, lacking the support of a cohesive national
framework for reform, state governments have taken it upon
themselves to address the flaws of a broken health care system.
The successes and failures of initiatives in states such as
Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, and California provide valuable
lessons in crafting effective reform. Massachusetts, Maine, and
Vermont have all demonstrated some degree of success with their
versions of health care reform legislation. And while California's
efforts ultimately failed, the attempt at reform remains an
illuminating example for policy makers. All reinforce the point
that cost containment initiatives, in tandem with coverage
mandates, will be essential in achieving truly effective reform and
making health care more affordable for all.
A. Massachusetts
The challenges Massachusetts has faced in reining in the
costs of care underscore the necessity of directly addressing cost
containment from the outset of any comprehensive reform effort.
While the number of those without insurance was halved in
Massachusetts in 2006, closing the last few percentage points for
universal coverage has remained elusive, and costs have ballooned
as the full need for subsidies became clear.49 Generally speaking,
this is because Massachusetts prioritized expanded access over
dealing with the cost burden. As a result, the anticipated savings
from an individual mandate have not come to fruition. 50 When
Massachusetts' comprehensive health care reform law51 was
passed in 2006, the "assumptions were that the price of insurance
premiums would fall as young, healthy uninsured people joined
the ranks of the insured and that fewer people would use hospital
emergency rooms for non-emergencies." 52 What has happened,
however, is that many have chosen to purchase insurance only
49. Marilyn Werber Serafini, The Lessons of Massachusetts, NAT'L J.,
July 18, 2009, at 22.
50. Id. at 22-3.
51. Chapter 58 of the Massachusetts Acts of 2006, An Act Providing
Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care.
52. Id. at 24.
13
14 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:1
upon realizing they need it - and subsequently drop it once their
immediate need has passed.53 Massachusetts's $900 penalty for
noncompliance has failed to serve as an adequate disincentive for
this kind of behavior. 54  In fact, a Harvard-Pilgrim study
estimated that between April 2008 and March 2009,
approximately 40 percent of new enrollees remained enrolled for
fewer than five months and incurred about $2,400 per person in
medical expenses per month on average - about 600 percent above
what the insurer would have otherwise anticipated. 55  It is
becoming increasingly clear that coverage mandates will not work
without the accompaniment of additional measures that directly
address the costs of care. As a result, Massachusetts has
aggressively pushed forward with a health care cost containment
commission, and is in the process of implementing payment and
benefit reforms to get costs under control. This remains a
cautionary tale for both federal reformers and those who seek to
implement state level reforms.
B. Maine
While the fact remains that cost containment initiatives will
be an essential component to effective reform, the experience in
Maine illustrates how such endeavors cannot, on their own,
significantly reduce the uninsured population or succeed in
making universal care affordable to all. Maine's Dirigo Health
Reform Act (Maine Public Law 469) of 2003 took an ambitiously
comprehensive three-pronged approach to reform, aiming to
achieve universal access to quality and affordable health care for
all Maine citizens within a five year timeframe by simultaneously
addressing cost, quality, and acceSS. 56 The Act established boards
and commissions tasked with implementing research-based
reform measures in all three areas.5 7 To address quality concerns,
the Reform Act established the Maine Quality Forum. This entity
53. The Massachusetts Health Mess, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2009, at A10.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Jill Rosenthal and Cynthia Pernice, Dirigo Health Reform Act:
Addressing Health Care Costs, Quality, and Access in Maine, NAT'L AcAD. FOR
STATE HEALTH POL'Y, at 1 (June 2004), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/Dirigo.pdf.
57. Id. at 4.
2010] PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE REFORM
was tasked with releasing public reports on provider performance
and quality outcomes, along with promoting evidence-based
medicine and the consolidation of medical record databases. 58 The
Reform Act also established the Dirigo Health Plan and
DirigoChoice, an insurance package aimed at individuals without
access to employer-sponsored plans.59 Insurance, subsidized on a
sliding scale tethered to income brackets, would be available as a
low-cost alternative for eligible individuals and for those whose
income falls below 300 percent of the Federal Poverty Level. 60
Under the original statute, the headwaters of the plan's revenue
stream would be a combination of savings derived from two
sources: the elimination of bad debt associated with the costs of
the uninsured within the state, and funds channeled through the
state's Medicaid organization, MaineCare. It would also rely on
individual and employer contributions, and a one year initial
injection of state funds.61
The Reform Act employed several strategies to contain the
cost of care in Maine.62 The Act encouraged greater transparency
in the health care marketplace by requiring hospitals and
providers to release cost averages on the fifteen most common in-
patient and twenty most common out-patient services. 63
Additionally, the Act directed the state's Bureau of Insurance to
review and publicly release the administrative costs and
underwriting gain of carriers throughout the state. Bad debt and
"charity" (free) care to the under and uninsured were cited as
major contributing factors in increasing the cost of insurance.64
By making affordable primary care accessible to the previously
uninsured, it was expected that nearly $80 million could be saved
annually as the population shifted to regular preventative care
rather than resorting to the costly hospital procedures required by
delayed medical attention. 65
58. Id. at 1.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id. at 10, 13; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS
(NCSL), COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORMS: STATE EXAMPLES (November
2009), http://ncsl.org/?tabid=14496.
61. Rosenthal & Pernice, supra note 56, at 10.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
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Encouragingly, assessments of annual savings have increased
steadily each year since the Act's passage, with one estimate
placing the total amount saved through 2008 at $150 million. 66
Furthermore, hospital operational costs continue to decline. 67
However, while having demonstrated some success in reducing
consumer costs, 68 the overall performance of the Dirigo plan has
fallen short of expectations. 69 Originally aiming to expand
coverage to nearly all of Maine's 128,000 uninsured citizens, as of
August 2009 only about 9,000 were enrolled in Dirigo Choice. 70
Having failed to recoup the expected level of funds from savings
offsets, Dirigo Health has been forced to scale back its operations
in order to remain fiscally sound. It placed a cap on enrollment in
September of 2007.71 The experience in Maine yields an
important lesson for those crafting federal reform: in order to fully
deflate the ballooning costs of care, legislation like Maine's will
need to be accompanied by a coverage mandate.
C. Vermont
Similar in design to DirigoChoice, Vermont's Catamount
Health Plan has encountered the same problems with under
enrollment. 72  Established in 2006 in the Health Care
Affordability Act (H 861), Catamount Health was created as a
standardized package to be provided in a new insurance market
and offered by voluntarily participating insurers. 73  It was
66. In re: Review of Aggregate Measurable Cost Savings Determined by
Dirigo Health for the Fourth Assessment Year, No. INS-08-900 (Sept. 28,
2008) (Maine Dept. of Professional and Financial Regulation, Bureau of
Insurance).
67. DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT STATE FISCAL YEAR (2008) 1-
2, available at http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov/Documents/SFY%202008%
20Annual%2OReport%20012009.pdf [hereinafter DIRIGo ANNUAL REPORT].
68. Id.
69. DIRIGo HEALTH AGENCY, DIRIGO HEALTH MONTHLY NUMBERS (Aug.
2009), http://www.dirigo health.maine.gov/Documents/NumbersAugust09.pdf.
70. Id.
71. DIRIGo ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 2.
72. Stefanie Sidortsova, Vermont Public Interest Research and
Education Fund, Scoring Catamount Health: Examining Vermont's Progress
Toward an Equitable Health System 3 (August 2008).
73. Health Care Affordability for Vermonters Act, 2006 Vt. Acts &
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designed to be a first step in effectuating a shift away from acute
(wrong time, wrong place) treatment and towards long term
chronic disease and preventative medicine in Vermont, thereby
slowing the growth of insurance premiums and reducing levels of
medical bad debt. 74 Like Maine, Vermont would subsidize the
purchase of Catamount Health for those with incomes below 300
percent of the Federal Poverty Level. Going one step further,
Catamount Health would, by law, be forbidden from charging
patients for preventative care as well as recommended protocols
for treatment of chronic conditions such as asthma or diabetes.
This focus on incentivizing preventative care is essential to
achieving significant cost control. Funding for Catamount Health
would come primarily from Medicaid dollars (about 60 percent of
the plan's total cost). The rest would come from increases in the
state's cigarette tax and from assessments on employers for
employees who are not offered insurance or who are offered
insurance yet decline to enroll.75
When the Catamount Health Plan was enacted in 2006, it
was projected that 96 percent of all Vermonters could be covered
by 2010. However based on early enrollment trends, this goal
proved to be unrealistically optimistic. Rather than 4 percent,
close to 26 percent of Vermonters under the age of 65 went
without health insurance for all or part of the two-year period
from 2007 to 2008.76 By June of 2008, only 4,265 individuals were
enrolled in Catamount Health, well under projected levels. 77
In response to these sobering statistics, Vermont legislators
have moved at an impressive pace to make the necessary
modifications to their reform package. Act 71 of 2007 described in
detail the state's objectives for reform and, in turn, provided a
timeline within which they must be reached. 78  It also
commissioned work groups to evaluate the efficacy of under-
Resolves No. 191, §2.
74. Id.
75. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, supra note 60; Health
care Affordability for Vermonters Act, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 191, §16.
76. FAMILIES USA, The Uninsured: A Closer Look - Vermonters Without
Health Insurance (March 2009),
http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdrs/americans-at-risk/vermont.pdf.
77. Sidortsova, supra note 72, at 3 n.8.
78. Act of June 5, 2007, 2007 Vt. Laws 71 (increasing access to affordable
health care coverage).
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performing programs, and to make recommendations on future
systemic improvements. 79 Aiming to rectify under-enrollment
issues, a 2008 act (Act 203) relaxed the eligibility requirements for
Catamount Health plans and introduced a new public health
initiative that incentivized healthy living by offering discounts for
enrollees participating in smoking cessation programs, exercise
routines, and other wellness oriented endeavors.80 The rates of
health care enrollment have increased at an encouraging pace
since.
Despite initial operational difficulties, there is considerable
cause for hope in Vermont. The speed with which the State has
been able to adapt has enabled it to overcome an initial barrier
posed by minor flaws in its original design. This urgency is not
accidental; since the passage of the first bill in 2006, legislators
have been prompted to move quickly by "trigger mechanisms"
installed in their reform proposals. If coverage goals are not met
by the start of 2011, the General Assembly must consider
implementing an individual mandate based on the operational
recommendations of a reform commission. 81  With a
contemporaneous focus on universal coverage, cost containment,
and public health initiatives, Vermont may yet succeed where
others have failed and provide a useful example for national
reform.
D. California
In contrast, California lawmakers considered health care
reform proposals in 2007, but failed to pass any into law. The bill
that came closest, ABX1 1, was a bipartisan document endorsed
by Governor Schwarzenegger and written by Assembly Speaker
Fabian Nunez. Its explicit aim was to increase coverage to near
universal levels without requiring major modifications to the
existing insurance and delivery system frameworks - an objective
that, perhaps unsurprisingly, revealed itself to be untenable.
Various proposals addressing cost containment issues were indeed
discussed, including pay-for-performance paradigms, health
79. Id. at § 8(b).
80. See generally An Act Relating to Health Care Reform, 2008 Vt. Acts
& Resolves No. 203.
81. Health care Affordability for Vermonters Act, 2006 Vt. Acts &
Resolves No. 191, §21.
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technology upgrades, and expanded regulation and transparency
in the insurance industry. Nevertheless, these options were
eventually rejected.82 Ultimately, the cost of achieving expanded
coverage became an insurmountable barrier. The most common
objection from state senators revolved around the fiscal
implications of reform for a state burdened with budget problems
and beleaguered by an economic recession. 83 Different proposals
were estimated to carry a cost of $8 to $15 billion per year for the
state, and a heated debate ensued over the source(s) of these
funds. A proposed two percent physician revenue fee was dropped
in light of objections from the California Medical Association. 84 A
predecessor to ABX1 1, AB 8, which relied on employer fees to
finance the package, was summarily rejected in response to bitter
objections from the California Chamber of Commerce. 85 ABX1 1
itself was to be funded through a combination of sources including
an employer payroll fee, a four percent hospital revenue fee, an
increase on tobacco taxes ($1.75 per pack of cigarettes), federal
matching funds, and resource reallocations from county budgets. 86
Spreading the source of revenue across several institutions and
constituencies likely helped get ABX1 1 as far as it did.
Nevertheless, these innovative options were not enough to get the
bill passed into law. The California experience yields a clear
takeaway: truly effective health care reform is impossible to
achieve without specific attention paid to reining in the
underlying costs of care.
82. For a summary of the plans that were adopted, see Eliot K. Wicks,




83. See Marian R. Mulkey and Mark D. Smith, The Long and Winding
Road: Reflections on California's 'Year of Health Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS
(web exclusive), Mar. 24, 2009.
84. California Medical Association, What CMA is Doing for You: 2007
Accomplishments, available at
http://www.cmanet.org/publicdoc.cfm?docid=l 1&parentid=l.
85. For a summary of the California Chamber of Commerce's objections,
see California Chamber of Commerce, CalChamber Responds to Latest
Health Care Proposal (Nov. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/humanresourceshealthsafety/pages/1 1
072007ts.aspx.
86. Wicks, supra note 82, at 4.
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VI. HEALTH CARE REFORM IN RHODE ISLAND
For the past two years, legislation has been introduced aimed
at simultaneously covering more Rhode Islanders and reducing
costs. As part of this initiative, the Mission: Healthy RI work
group, which included over eighty Rhode Islanders, worked with
health experts from outside Rhode Island and across the health
care field to examine the nuts and bolts of achieving these
objectives. The group concluded that the centerpiece of a
successful reform would be an "exchange entity" - or as it was
dubbed, "HealthHub RI." Under proposed legislation, 2009H-
7910, the HealthHub would play a key role in aligning payments
to priorities, setting minimum coverage standards, and
emphasizing preventative care and chronic disease management.
Additionally, pursuant to 2009S-2686, all individuals who could
afford to purchase health insurance would be required to do so.
Those residents whose income is below 400 percent of the poverty
level would receive a subsidy. Furthermore, employers with more
than ten employees would be assessed a health security fee if they
do not provide insurance to their employees. Thus the legislation
calls for both an individual mandate and an employer "pay or
play." According to the Health Insurance Commission of Rhode
Island, the individual mandate would have applied to close to
15,000 residents who are currently uninsured. Nevertheless,
neither the Health Hub legislation nor the individual
mandate/employer "pay or play" legislation were passed by the
General Assembly in the 2009 legislative session, in large part due
to uncertainties about how they might ultimately interact with
then wholly undefined federal reform initiatives.
Two initiatives were passed into law. House bill 2009H7645
and Senate bill 2009S2481 created a Health Rhode Island Health
Care Quality and Value Database which will collate data
regarding the utilization, cost and quality of health care in the
state. Companion legislation, House bill H7352 and Senate bill
S2484, authorized and directed the Department of Health to
develop a 5-year strategic plan to improve patient outcomes, focus
on primary care and prevention, reward quality care and promote
information technology, modeled on Vermont's public health and
preventive medicine initiatives. This legislation also directs the
department to develop best practice and care management plans
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for patients with certain chronic conditions. As previously
discussed, this kind of initiative has experienced some success in
Vermont, where the focus on prevention, primary care and
realigned reimbursement are viewed as some of the strongest
elements of the state level reform.
Another recent Rhode Island legislative proposal, 2009S-0188,
is an example of a direct attempt at cost containment. This
legislation targeted the medical loss ratio of insurers, a term
defined within the bill as "the ratio between the amount that is
spent for medical services covered by the insurer and the amount
of revenue from health insurance premiums taken in by the
insurer." If passed, insurers and health maintenance
organizations would be required to maintain a minimum medical
loss ratio of 88 percent, leaving the remaining 12 percent of their
resources to be allocated to administrative costs, overhead, and
profit. Insurers who do not comply would be taxed the lesser of 1
percent of their gross premiums on insurance contracts or the
difference between their reported medical loss ratio and 88
percent. Their tax liability would be zero if they achieved a
medical loss ratio greater than or equal to the bill's target
amount.87
Under 2009S-0188, insurers' medical loss ratios would be
evaluated by the Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner, an
institution unique to Rhode Island that provides the state with a
powerful tool to wield in bringing about health care reform. Unlike
other states, the regulation of health insurance in Rhode Island
falls under the purview of this specialized institution rather than
being assigned to a regulatory body in charge of all types of
insurance (auto, home, etc.). The Office of the Health Insurance
Commissioner was established by 2004S-3101, one in a series of
five bills referred to collectively as The Rhode Island Health Care
Reform Act of 2004.88 The Office is vested with the authority to
review health insurance rate filings and conduct public hearings.
In the past such reviews focused solely on insurer solvency but
with the passage of the Rhode Island Health Care Reform Act of
2004, the health insurance commissioner is now empowered to
weigh the affordability of health insurance for the public in
87. S.B. 188, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2009).
88. 2004 R.I. Acts & Resolves S3101.
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reviewing all rate changes. The legislation also enables the Office
of the Health Insurance Commissioner to make recommendations
to the director of Business Regulation and governor, propose
legislation, establish a consumer/business/medical advisory group,
propose caps on reserves, review administrative expenses, pursue
quality improvement, review copays and deductibles, review
competition in the marketplace, review reimbursement policies,
review best practices for high-cost insurance enrollees, require a
health insurance governance report, and assist in the developing
standardized designs for billing.89 With such a broad array of
powers and a specific focus, the Office of the Health Insurance
Commissioner gives Rhode Island a unique catalyst that can be
used to rapidly bring about effective cost containment initiatives
and progressive health care reform measures.
VII. RHODE ISLAND IS WELL POSITIONED TO IMPLEMENT PENDING
FEDERAL HEALTH CARE REFORM
At the time of this writing, there is much uncertainty about
the "when" and "what" of health care reform coming out of
Washington. However these uncertainties are ultimately
resolved, two basic principles remain: (1) a federal framework for
comprehensive reform addressing mandates and subsidies will
continue to be very important to support effective state level
reform; and (2) the minimum necessary elements for
comprehensive health care reform emerge from a careful
examination of what has been done in other states. The first
lesson from other New England states is that expanding access to
coverage must be accompanied by simultaneous attention to cost
containment of the underlying costs of care. The second lesson is
that a comprehensive reform must be multi-layered and must
contain, at a minimum, certain key elements. Those elements
include some combination of (1) an individual mandate, (2) an
employer "pay or play" provision, (3) a subsidy to make the
purchase of health insurance affordable for those mandated to
obtain it, and (4) a health insurance exchange through which to
89. Press Release, R.I. General Assembly, Health Care Reform Act
Submitted to Address Health Care Concerns (May 11, 2004),
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/news/prl.asp?prid=1160.
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implement these other elements and, importantly, to serve as an
essential locus from which to deploy key payment and benefit
reforms that will address the underlying cost containment issue.
Further, attention must be paid to the drivers of health care
cost. Beyond payment reform and benefit design reform, the
actual structure of the health care delivery system must be
addressed. Attention paid to incentivizing primary and
preventive care, requiring adherence to best practices for chronic
disease management, and rewarding well care rather than sick
care will yield dividends in the long term sustainability of any
comprehensive health care reform to be implemented in Rhode
Island.
Federal reform, when it happens, will provide a platform from
which to deploy meaningful change in Rhode Island. It is likely
that any version of the federal reform under discussion will at
least put in place the heretofore elusive individual mandate and
employer "pay or play," thus fulfilling the goal of getting (nearly)
everyone "in the pool." The federal reform will also likely provide
the most basic framework and funding for the subsidy necessary
to expand coverage - a goal unachievable for Rhode Island acting
alone in the face of a serious state budget crisis.
However, there will be much for policy makers in Rhode
Island to do, both before and after federal action is taken, in order
to make a federal framework a reality. To date, we have done
much of the work to be ready to implement an exchange or health
insurance hub in Rhode Island. Indeed, we have in place the
infrastructure of the Office of the Health Insurance Commissioner
to facilitate the process of structuring the payment, delivery
system and benefit reforms made possible by the existence of an
exchange. Enabling legislation for the Cost and Quality Database
and the statewide strategic plan for health, passed in 2009,
created the tools necessary for market reforms and the
implementation of best practices in chronic disease management
and a primary care, wellness and prevention focus. Rhode Island
is thus poised to act on federal health care reform and 2010 should
prove to be a watershed year within which to make significant
progress toward affordable, quality health care for all Rhode
Islanders.
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